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Abstract
The novel Inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus is attacking the world in 2009. Among others, campuses in China, particu-
larly most university/college campuses for bachelor students, are at-risk areas where many susceptible youngsters live.
They most likely interact with each other quite often in dormitories, classrooms and refectories. We model the pan-
demic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) transmission through campus contacts and then forecast the eﬀectiveness of interventions,
based on a previously presented Complex Agent Network model for simulating infectious diseases [1]. Our results
suggest that pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) on campus will die out even with no intervention taken; the most eﬀective
intervention is still quarantining conﬁrmed cases as early as possible and, in addition, vaccinating susceptible people
can further decrease the maximum daily number of the infected. This study can support quantitative experimentation
and prediction of infectious diseases within predeﬁned areas, and assessment of intervention strategies.
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1. Introduction
The novel Inﬂuenza A (H1N1), or called Human Swine Inﬂuenza/Swine Flu, spreading internationally from Mex-
ico in 2009, has caused a serious epidemic in China. China is highly susceptible to pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1)
due to its big population and high residential density, besides the infectious disease’s high infectiousness. According
to Ministry of Health of China, until 30th Sep 2009, the provinces in China mainland had reported 19589 conﬁrmed
cases, 14348 cured cases, 10 sever cases and very few death cases [2]. However, experts believe that the epidemic
will show an uptrend in the subsequent months in China.
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Pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) is thus far a relatively mild illness seen predominantly in those who are healthy and
under 24 years of age, perhaps reﬂecting protection from previous human inﬂuenza exposure in older people [3]. Thus
the outbreak of pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) at school has obtained considerate concerns [e.g. 4, 5, 6, 7]. Initially,
most cases were clustered in households and schools, with over 50% of the reported cases in schoolchildren in the 5-
to 18-year-old age range [6]. J. Medlock and A. P. Galvani concluded that oﬃcials should target vaccination to those
that contribute the greatest transmission, i.e., schoolage children and their parents [7].
In China, the impact of pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) transmission at school also emerges. For example, from
18th to 25th Sep 2009, schools in Hunan (a province of China) had reported 19 collective infections with 73 conﬁrmed
cases [8]; some had taken interventions such as suspending classes, closing campuses, quarantining conﬁrmed cases
and vaccinating.
Campuses in China, particularly most university/college campuses for bachelor students, are somewhat diﬀerent
from those elsewhere with respect to the students’ residential and alimentary characteristics, which makes them at-
high-risk areas for virus propagation. Students are usually assigned to dormitories after enrollment. During semesters,
each student moves daily between the dormitory, crowded refectories and classrooms on campus. Generally, a few
refectories are located scatteredly within the campus and provide meal services during rush hours, so that for each
meal students choose one from those refectories taking into consideration locations, distances and preferences etc..
Altogether, students have close contacts with acquaintances in dormitories, and many casual contacts with teachers,
schoolmates and personnel in classrooms and refectories. Therefore, the whole population living within the campus
compose a large cluster during the course of a campus outbreak of airborne inﬂuenza A (H1N1).
Although the basic biology [9], practical advice for clinicians in terms of case deﬁnitions and treatments [10] and
surveys of public knowledge and misconceptions [11] of this novel ﬂu has been well studied, there has been relatively
little work on individual-based quantitative simulation and forecast of pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) spreading. Cur-
rent quantitative studies on the spread of pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) are mostly focused on mathematical models
[e.g. 6, 12], in which a strong assumption is existent that all members of the population contribute equally to the
spread of the disease. Nevertheless in reality, the likelihood of spreading virus varies across members.
In this paper, we model the pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) transmission through campus contacts and then forecast
the eﬀectiveness of interventions, tailoring a previously presented Complex Agent Network model for simulating
infectious diseases [1] according to the characteristics of pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) spreading. In our model, the
campus population is modeled as a social network with nodes representing individuals and edges representing contact
between two people, and each individual (node) with heterogenous disease progression is further modeled as a host
agent. Thus, the probability of infection for a susceptible individual is determined by the connectivity (degree) of the
individual (node) and the infection status of his/her partners (neighboring nodes) in the networks. Subsequently, three
categories of experiments with no intervention taken, conﬁrmed cases quarantined and conﬁrmed cases quarantined
plus randomly chosen people vaccinated, respectively, are conducted to evaluate the eﬀectiveness of interventions.
2. Model
2.1. Basic Assumptions
In the 2009 inﬂuenza A (H1N1), the virus isolated from patients in the United States was found to be made up of
genetic elements from four diﬀerent ﬂu viruses: North American swine inﬂuenza, North American avian inﬂuenza,
human inﬂuenza and swine inﬂuenza virus typically found in Asia and Europe – “an unusually mongrelised mix of
genetic sequences” [9, 13]. The inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus is highly transmissible but of no greater virulence than
seasonal inﬂuenza to date [10, 14].
To tentatively investigate the impact of pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) on campus, we elaborate on some simpli-
fying assumptions as follows.
1. Each infected individual is equally infectious, excluding the case of super infectors.
2. The virulence of the pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus remains changeless during the course of spreading.
3. The immunity and susceptibility of each individual is identical regardless of his/her age. This means an as-
sumption of homogeneous immunity and susceptibility structure in the population, which holds for our study.
4. The duration of incubation follows a uniform distribution of 1-2 days, and patients at this period are assumed
to be non-infectious.
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5. The duration of symptomatic period follows a uniform distribution of 1-7 days. An individual will get diagnosed
immediately after the symptoms appear and ﬁnally get recovered at the end of the symptomatic period with no
mortality.
6. The infectiousness of an infected individual remains changeless during the course of symptomatic period
(asymptomatic excluded).
7. We consider no demographical eﬀect, i.e., ignoring the inﬂuence of people’s inﬂow and outﬂow on the virus
spreading. We believe that after a pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) outbreak, the inter-contacts within the pop-
ulation rather than the inter-contacts between the population and the outside accounts for the greatest con-
tribution to pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) spreading. Additionally, schools might close campuses and urge
conﬁrmed/suspected students to stay in a hospital or dormitory, which further enlarges the contribution.
8. Individuals become immune to pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) virus with no exception either after getting re-
covered from previous infection or with a delay of 14-21 days after vaccinated.
2.2. Model Construction
2.2.1. Agent-based Host Model
We construct the host model of individuals by using agent-base modeling. Agent-based Modeling, or Individual-
based Modeling, are used to study complex systems through a so-called bottom-up or micro-macro methodology.
Unpredictable however realistic system emergence is expected to occur based on the aggregation of simple individual
behavior through interactions between individuals [15].
The infection progression of a host is shown as Fig. 1. Each susceptible host can be infected by people with
whom he/she interacts with on campus. After the infection, his disease status transfers to the incubation with assumed
non-infectiousness and then the symptomatic period with infectiousness. An individual ﬁnally can get recovered or
die (excluded in Sec. 2.1 for our simulations) from the infection. Aside from this, a susceptible individual can refrain
from getting infected by vaccination. Therefore, individuals can become immunized by either natural immunization
(recovery from the previous infection) or random vaccination.
Figure 1: Infection Progression of a Host Agent
2.2.2. Contact Model between Hosts
We use social networks, a subgroup of complex network [16, 17], to abstract the complex contacts between hosts.
A social network is a set of people or groups of people with some pattern of contacts or interactions between them
[17]. The topological structure of a network implies sociological and epidemiological statistical achievements on the
contacting rules in a given social community. An edge, representing interaction between two hosts who are depicted
as nodes, denotes a possible occurrence of infection.
A schematic illustration of virus spreading in a network is shown as Fig. 2. The possible statuses of a host agent
form a set of being susceptible, at incubation, at symptomatic period, recovered, vaccinated, immunized and dead.
The transition of intra-host status depends on the host’s infection progression and treatment. Please note, the edges
in Fig. 2 remain unchanged except the cutoﬀ of those connecting to a dead individual; while in our simulations some
edges are removed or rewired with time steps to achieve high stochasticity.
On condition that we lack realistic statistical data on the interested population, we adopt scale-free networks
with small exponents to represent the complex interactions between hosts since many social networks are scale-free
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Figure 2: Virus Spreading in a Network
[18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. The degree distribution of nodes follows a power-law distribution pk = Ak−γ, where
A is a normalization factor. Due to the high clustering of individuals on campus, we set the distribution with small
exponents (γ ∈ [1.6, 1.8]).
We denote the transmission probability within a given period of time, say one day, across an edge which connects
an infected individual and a susceptible individual as P, and the number of infected contacts with whom this suscep-
tible individual interact within one day as ni (6 ki which is the degree of the corresponding node), the susceptible
individual gets infected with a probability
TPi = 1 − (1 − P)ni .
3. Simulation Results
We perform pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) spreading simulations in a population of 10000 representing the cam-
pus community. Initially, a randomly chosen individual is set to be infected and the time step is set to be one day.
3.1. No Intervention Taken
4 sets of simulations are performed by setting γ as 1.6 and 1.7, and P as 0.01 and 0.02, respectively, with no
intervention taken. Fig. 3 shows the temporal involution of the number of infected individuals within 90 days
(averaged over 30 realizations).
According to the curves of the number of the infected shown in Fig. 3, pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) on campus
dies out even though that many people might get involved during the course and no intervention has been taken. This is
most likely due to the non-diﬃcult recovery from infection within a short period (in days or weeks) and the consequent
natural immunization, besides the intrinsically changing diﬀusivity of networks themselves for virus spreading. At
the beginning, networks display low diﬀusivity when the infected are few. Then the diﬀusivity increases with the
increase in the number of the infected. After days, the diﬀusivity drops again with the decrease in the number of the
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Figure 3: Simulated Results with no Intervention Taken
susceptible and the increase in the number of the naturally immunized. Therefore, each curve peaks only once in the
middle when recovery instead of infection turns to be dominant. For example, the peak at 1487 infected occurs on the
42nd day when γ = 1.6, P = 0.02 and the peak at 578 occurs on the 56th day when γ = 1.6, P = 0.01. Additionally,
the simulated result of the number of the infected is primarily sensitive to the exponent of pow-law degree distribution
and secondarily to P.
3.2. Conﬁrmed Cases Quarantined
With ﬁxed values of γ = 1.6 and P = 0.02, 4 other sets of simulations are performed by starting quarantine all
conﬁrmed cases from the 5th, 13rd, 23rd and 33rd day onwards, namely with a delay of, respectively, 2, 10, 20 and
30 days after the ﬁrst case conﬁrmed. Fig. 4 shows the temporal involution of the number of infected individuals
within 90 days (averaged over 30 realizations).
As shown in Fig. 4, the earlier quarantine is started, the more eﬀective it is to interdict pandemic inﬂuenza A
(H1N1). The peak at 1396 infected occurs on the 50th day with conﬁrmed cases quarantined from the 33rd day
onwards, which delays the epidemic peak for 8 days (from 42rd to 50th) but shows no signiﬁcant decrease in the
number of the infected at the peak, compared to the corresponding result simulated with no intervention taken. If
quarantine is started from the 23rd day onwards, the peak at 514 occurs on the 54th day. Moreover, if quarantine is
started from the 5th day onwards, pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) will be interdicted entirely.
3.3. Conﬁrmed Cases Quarantined plus Randomly Chosen Susceptible People Vaccinated
Aside from quarantining conﬁrmed cases from the 33rd day on, 100 randomly chosen susceptible individuals
are vaccinated on 20th, 30th and 50th day, respectively, to perform 3 other sets of simulations. Fig. 5 shows the
temporal involution of the number of infected individuals within 90 days (averaged over 30 realizations).
On the basis of quarantine, additionally vaccinating a group of randomly chosen susceptible individuals can further
decrease the number of the infected occurring at the peak. As shown in Fig. 5, following quarantine from the 33rd
day onwards, the peak at 1189 occurs on the 49th day with 100 susceptible vaccinated on the 30th day and the peak
at 765 occurs on the 46th day with 100 vaccinated on the 20th day.
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Figure 4: Simulated Results with Conﬁrmed Cases Quarantined (abbr as Q.)
Figure 5: Simulated Results with Conﬁrmed Cases Quarantined plus Randomly Chosen Susceptible Individuals Vaccinated (abbr as V.)
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4. Conclusions
In this study, we present an approach for quantitatively evaluating interventions in the Inﬂuenza A (H1N1) epi-
demic on China campus grounded on individual-based modeling and simulation. It can be used as an alternative
method for tentatively modeling the spreading of pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) or other seasonal inﬂuenza on China
campus, with heterogeneity in personal disease progression and number of contacts considered.
Our simulated results suggest that pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) on campus will die out even with no interven-
tion taken; the most eﬀective intervention is still quarantining conﬁrmed cases as early as possible and, in addition,
vaccinating susceptible people can further decrease the maximum daily number of the infected.
However, placing people in quarantine is not good for economics [25]. People that have to stay home or in some
sort of quarantine cannot work. Also, closing schools will mean that many parents are forced to stay home and cannot
work. The pandemic inﬂuenza A (H1N1) is mild, but putting people in quarantine is therefore very drastic which we
usually decline during a normal seasonal ﬂu.
Our study is limited because of the assumption that the transmission probability across an edge which connects
an infected individual and a susceptible individual within a given period of time is identical. However, the transmis-
sion probability is various with respect to age, the infected individual’s infectiousness and the susceptible individual’s
susceptibility. Therefore, much more needs to be known about the interactions between people through which trans-
missions arise and realistic mixing patterns in a population, before our model will be possible to accurately predict an
epidemic on China campus.
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